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Abstract 
This article examines recent manifestations and trends of Azerbaijani nationalism, highlighting their complexity as they 
have evolved within regional and international contexts as expressions of Azerbaijani identity. It argues that although 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the l990s was instrumental in invoking and 
strengthening Azerbaijani nationalism, more recent manifestations of nationalism have been varied and responsive to 
domestic as well as international influences. These influences include the de-russification of Azerbaijani names, which 
began toward the end of the Soviet era, and the development of national movements aimed at promoting the country‟s 
image internationally. One means by which to achieve this latter goal has been record-setting, which has included the 
creation of the world‟s largest national flag, prioritization of sporting excellence and attempts to host major international 
sporting and other events, and grandiose construction of buildings, pipelines, and communication and transportation 
networks. The Azerbaijani diaspora has also been active in promoting an Azerbaijani identity in opposition to Armenia. 
At the regional level, expressions of Azerbaijani nationalism have caused apprehension within Iran that Iranian 
Azerbaijanis might participate in these movements. Diplomatic efforts have been aimed at achieving balance, especially 
in Azerbaijani relations with Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and the West. The article concludes that Azerbaijani 
nationalism is currently based on a weak economic foundation of extravagance enabled by oil and gas wealth. It 
recommends economic diversification, as well as a rethinking of Azerbaijani nationalism policy aimed toward fostering 
national identity in a less costly manner. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Defining Nationalism 
Azerbaijani nationalism is difficult to define or explain because of its complexity and its diverse domestic and 
international influences. Moreover, nationalism is itself a vague concept. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
nationalism entails feelings of loyalty and devotion toward a nation, and especially a sense of national consciousness. 
This leads to the exaltation of one nation above all others and the promotion of its culture and interests over those of 
other nations or supranational groups (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism).  
1.2. Azerbaijani Nationalism: A Historical Background 
Azerbaijan‟s history as a nation has been brief. Following its independence in 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic 
Republic (ADR) was constituted. However, from 1920 to 1991, the country was incorporated into the Soviet Union. 
Thus, there was little time to develop a sense of Azerbaijani nationalism. Not small people, who experienced the Soviet 
regime ascribed to a Soviet identity and considered Moscow as their second home. (Note 1). 
However, following the collapse of the USSR, a strong nationalistic base, promoted by the people and government of 
Azerbaijan, was required to build a viable sovereign state. 
Some nationalistic movements existed even during the Soviet period, although they were limited in terms of their 
capacity and scale. These were mainly constituted by the intelligentsia, especially from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. 
During this period, Azerbaijani nationalism was notably affected by Turkish and Iranian histories and cultures, and 
Islamic heritage. However, such movements were banned during the Soviet era. 
Azerbaijani nationalism was later revived by perestroika and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (hereafter, NKC) with the 
Armenians. (Note 2). 
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Nationalistic movements such as the Popular Front spread from Estonia to many of the Soviet republics in the wake of 
perestroika. Subsequently, the Baku Scientist Club established the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) during the summer 
of 1988. Despite opposition from the Communist Party, the movement continued to grow, not only because of 
perestroika, but also largely because of the NKC. On July 16, 1989, the APF held its founding congress and Abulfaz 
Elchibey was elected as the chairman of its executive board. The APF‟s main members were nationally conscious 
intellectuals and elites with shared nationalistic and secular goals. Similar to the Baltic Popular Fronts, the APF 
demanded greater economic, social, and political sovereignty for Azerbaijan and more local decision-making power, as 
well as control over Azerbaijan‟s national resources.  
In addition, the traumas inflicted by the NKC that created many victims, refugees, and internally displaced persons 
(Bolukbasi, 2011; Ohannes, 2013; Hirose, 2006, 2007; Demirtepe & Laciner, 2004) prompted the development of a 
strong sense of nationalism among Azerbaijanis. 
The reinforcement of nationalism among those who sustain heavy losses through conflict or war appears to be a 
common phenomenon throughout history. The occurrence of “Black January” in 1990, and Russia‟s support of Armenia 
during the NKC fueled anti-Russian sentiment among Azerbaijanis. (Note 3). 
Azerbaijani hostility toward Armenians, attributed to the NKC, has evidently strengthened Azerbaijani nationalism. 
However, over two decades have passed since the NKC ceasefire was declared in 1994, and while the conflict still 
features in the Azerbaijani media, it is fading from general consciousness. Consequently, other manifestations of 
Azerbaijani nationalism are assuming prominence. In recent years, the influence of Azerbaijani nationalism has 
extended into Iran, where many Azerbaijanis currently reside.  
This paper focuses on recent manifestations of Azerbaijani nationalism. However, before discussing these, it is 
important to understand and situate Azerbaijani nationalism within the country‟s authoritarian political context. 
1.3 Authoritarianism versus Democratization: The Context of Nationalism 
Azerbaijan‟s political regime since the Heydar period has been criticized for its authoritarianism by the international 
community, especially by organizations advocating human rights, free speech, and democratization. The current regime 
is also the first and only hereditary regime of the former USSR. However, notwithstanding international criticism, 
Azerbaijanis have shown a preference for authoritarianism over democracy, likely because of the value they place on 
stability. The extreme confusion caused by the NHK and the collapse of the former USSR has fostered conservatism 
among the Azerbaijani people. Many individuals describe this period as being very sad and difficult, professing a desire 
for stability. Additionally, the politics and legacy of Azerbaijan‟s second president, Abulfaz Elchibey, remain highly 
salient, if not traumatic, in the collective memory of Azerbaijanis. Elchibey supported democracy and sought to 
transform Azerbaijan into a democratic country. However, his policies also entailed forging close relations with Turkey 
and the West, while cutting off ties with Russia and Iran. This policy angered Russia, which then took the side of 
Armenia during the NHK. This development was the main cause of Azerbaijani defeat and the current territorial control, 
which the Azerbaijanis term “occupation.” In addition, people remember this as a time of food scarcity. For example, 
many could not procure bread, even after standing in line from 5:00 am.  
The region has been rocked by revolutions, including the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine in 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyz in 2005, and the Maidan Revolution in 2013 in Ukraine. While these 
initially appeared promising, they ultimately failed. Having observed these failed revolutions in close proximity, 
Azerbaijanis tend to view democratization as undermining stability. Consequently, they do not feel that democratization 
will be an effective solution for the country‟s problems, and continue to support the Aliyev regime because of the 
stability it has brought to Azerbaijan.  
2. Recent Manifestations of Azerbaijani Nationalism  
As mentioned above, while the NKC prompted Azerbaijani nationalism, the synergetic combination of people‟s 
perceptions and the activities of certain organized movements have effectively contributed to changing expressions of 
nationalism.  
This paper provides some examples aimed at stimulating reflection on these movements. In the sections below, I discuss 
the move toward de-russification of Azerbaijanis, specifically de-russification of their names. I next discuss the hosting 
of major global events, attempts at record-setting, construction of pipelines, and development of strong national teams 
as examples of official movements aimed at attaining global prominence. Lastly, I consider the Azerbaijani diaspora, 
focusing on their activities as they related to the Khojaly tragedy. 
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2.1 Naming Patterns in Azerbaijan 
In this section, I consider Azerbaijani nationalism in relation to anti-Russian sentiments through an examination of 
changes in naming practices (first and last names) in Azerbaijan. 
2.1.1 Russification of First Names 
Following Azerbaijan‟s incorporation into the Soviet regime, it became mandatory for Azerbaijanis to register their 
names and to add a Russian suffix such as “-yev” or “-ov” to male names and “-yeva” or “-ova” to female names.  
However, the majority of people did not have official surnames. Soviet bureaucrats often resolved this problem simply 
by adopting the name of the individual‟s father and adding traditional suffixes, such as “-yev” / “-yeva” or “-ov” / 
“-ova,” meaning “born of.” Some examples include the conversion of Ali to Aliyev (for a male) or Aliyeva (for a 
female), Husein to Huseinov or Huseinova, and Mammad (short for Mohammad) to Mammadov or Mammadova. 
First names changed gradually during the Soviet period, influenced by the social situation and communist ideology. The 
general shift in naming practices that occurred during this period was primarily influenced by Russian naming practices 
and the communist way of life. For example, many names referred to occupations such as Traktor (tractor) and 
Kombayn (combine). In addition, there were names associated with the Communist Party such as Narkom (from the 
Russian, Narodniy Komitet, which means people‟s committee) and Raykom (from the Azerbaijani Rayon Komitesi, 
meaning regional committee). In addition, many names such as Malumat (information) were influenced by the 
communist regime.  
During the 1920s and 1930s, new types of names became popular. Examples of male names included Azad (“freedom”), 
Bakhtiyar (“fortune”), Saadat (“happiness”), Ingilab (“revolution”), Mubariz (“struggle”), Mubarak and Tabrik (both 
meaning “best wishes”), and Vugar (“pride”), New names for females included Irada (“will” or “determination”), 
Matanat (“strength,” “steadiness,” or “tolerance”), Azade (“freedom”), and Rafiga (“friend” or “companion”), which 
suggested comradeship with men in building a new society. This naming pattern seems to have been intended as 
testimony of success or happiness associated with life in the Soviet Union. 
Given the widespread use of Russian in Azerbaijan, naming patterns were also influenced by Russian customs. In 1938, 
when Cyrillic was imposed in Azerbaijan, Arabic had already been officially replaced by a modified Latin script, 
introduced in 1928. However, there was considerable confusion regarding this script. Political realities also influenced 
naming practices. Popular acceptance of Russian naming patterns is reflected in birth certificates issued during the 
Soviet period. For example, in Russian, most female names contain three syllables, with the last syllable ending with 
the vowel “-a.” Examples include Ludmila, Svetlana, Natalya, Marina, Maria, and Tatyana. Whereas Russians stress the 
middle syllable in such names (e.g., lud-MI-la, svet-LA-na), in traditional Azerbaijani names, the stress is always on the 
last syllable of a name such as ley-LA (Leyla), sev-DA (Sevda), and re-NA (Rena). The fact that Azerbaijanis rarely 
adopted Russian names, outright, for their children at the beginning of the Soviet period raises the question of whether 
such a gesture would have overstepped Russian and/or Azerbaijani boundaries and norms. Nonetheless, Azerbaijanis 
gradually emulated and incorporated Russian naming patterns. Some selected names, especially for girls, derived from 
international stories that sounded like Russian three-syllable names such as Molière‟s Elmira, Zemfira (from Pushkin‟s 
Gypsies), Amalia, Ophelia, Aida, Tamilla, Tamara, and Esmira (from Esmeralda in Hugo‟s Hunchback of Notre Dame).  
Another way of russifying traditional Azerbaijani female names was to add “-a” as a final third syllable to the original 
name. For example, Narmin became Narmina and Gulnar became Gulnara. The final “-a” suffix was also added to 
feminize traditional Azerbaijani male names (e.g., Adil–Adila, Farid–Farida, Ilham–Ilhama, Natig–Natiga, and Ramiz–
Ramiza.)  
Azerbaijani male names were similarly russified. The most common practice during the 1940s and 1950s was to select a 
fairly short Azerbaijani name consisting of two syllables. Invariably, the first syllable contained an “a” or an “o,” and 
the second syllable contained an “i” as in Rafig, Faig, Shaig, Namig, Natig, and Tofig. The final “g” in these names was 
often pronounced as the final “k” in traditional Russian-sounding names (e.g., Vladik from Vladislav, Slavik from 
Svyatoslav, and Stasik from Stanislav). Many such Azerbaijani names are actually of Arabic origin, but in some cases, 
when transmitted via Turkish, they were pronounced and spelled with a final “k” as in Russian (e.g., Rafik, Faik, Shaik, 
Namik, Natik, and Tofik). The transformation, therefore, occurred naturally and was easily accepted by both 
communities. This pattern of imitating Russian names by substituting a final “k” is still fairly prevalent. 
From the 1960s to 1990s, the practice of adopting names of foreign origin and then russifying them was very popular. 
Names of this type included Dinara, Diana, Elza, Elvira, Ellada, Elina, Kamilla, and Emil.  
Thus, while the government did not issue any official decrees on naming, which was left to the discretion of parents, the 
russification of names was a natural outcome of the national Soviet policy and demonstrated the association of names 
with people‟s identities.  
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2.1.2 De-russification of First Names 
Despite its progress, a countercurrent opposed the russification process, and some people attempted to use names to 
express resistance. 
While newly russified names were being adopted, “fresh” and “new-sounding” but decidedly Azerbaijani names 
appeared during the Soviet period. For example, at least 14 names were incorporated into the Azerbaijani naming 
system from the works of Jafar Jabbarli, Azerbaijan‟s first major playwright of the Soviet period. These included male 
names such as Oqtay (“one who stays with his tribe or people”), Yashar (“existing” or “living”), Elkhan (denoting one 
of the earliest Turkic ranks), Aydin (“clear”), Qorkhmaz (“fearless”), Donmaz (“not shifting” or “turning from „The 
Way‟”) and Sonmaz (“eternally burning” or “eternally lit”). Female names derived from Jabbarli‟s work include Almas 
(“diamond”), Solmaz (“unfading” or “always fresh”), Gyultakin (“like a flower”), Sevil (“beloved”), Gyular (“smiling” 
or “laughing”), Gyunduz (“daytime”) and Gyulush (“laughter”). These Azerbaijani names continue to be very popular.  
During the late 1940s and 1950s, the renowned national poet, Samad Vurgun created names for the Moon using the 
Turkic root “Ay” (pronounced as “eye”). These included Aygyun (“moon-sun”) and Aybeniz (“moon-faced”). Vurgun 
named his own daughter Aybeniz and his granddaughter, Aygyun. With the establishment of these names within 
Azerbaijani society, people began to create new names with the stems “Ay” (moon) and “Gyun” (sun) such as Aynur 
(“moonlight”), Gyunay (“sun-moon”), and Ayten (“like the moon”). Azerbaijanis continue to build upon this stem and 
to introduce new names, such as Aytaj (“moon-crown”), Ayshan (“moon-happy”) and Aysel (“moon-rushing waters”). 
These names are highly popular in contemporary Azerbaijani society. 
Thus, the move to de-russify names occurred naturally toward the end of the Soviet period. Some people changed their 
names by removing Russian suffixes and either adding traditional suffixes or omitting the suffixes altogether. They 
found it very difficult to change their names during the perestroika period, when this movement began because of the 
negative reactions of most officials. However, such name changes gradually gained acceptance.  
2.1.3 Azerbaijani Surnames 
As mentioned above, many Azerbaijanis have removed “-(y)ev”, “-(y)eva”, “-ov”, and “ova” from their surnames. 
Some have substituted traditional suffixes, such as “-zade” (of Persian origin, meaning “born of” as in Pashazade or 
Alizade) and “-li” / “-lu” (of Turkish origin, meaning “with” or “belonging to” as in Khanli or Koprulu), while others 
have omitted suffixes entirely. The choice of suffixes (none, Persian, or Turkish) constitutes one way for people to 
express their identities.  
Name changes have also occurred in other ways. For example, in the name Narmina, the Russian-sounding final 
syllable “a” has been dropped, reverting the name to Narmin. An examination of 200 birth certificates issued in 1990–
1996 revealed five occurrences of the name Narmin, while Narmina occurred only once. This is the opposite pattern to 
that found among 180 female names examined in the archival records for 1967–1990, wherein six records with Narmina 
and one with Narmin were found (Garibova & Blair, 1996).  
At the time of writing, de-russification of names has become a popular trend that is being encouraged by the 
government.  
The Azerbaijani Terminology Commission has expressed concern regarding non-Azerbaijani sounding names. The 
deputy head of the Commission has even stated that Russian-sounding names like Maria Yekaterina, Olya, Alya, Sergey, 
Alexsandr, Dmitry, and Mikhail will be banned in the near future. She added that no Azerbaijani would want to marry 
someone with a Russian-sounding name. The rules would only apply to children who are ethnically Azeri. Foreigners 
living in Azerbaijan could still choose their children‟s names freely. 
The Azerbaijani Terminology Commission has further stated that long names composed of two or three names such as 
Najafguly (Najaf and Gulu), should be banned, and that people should instead choose short, names. Under presidential 
decree, the Commission has already submitted name changing proposals to the Azerbaijan government.  
Although outright banning of these names may not be realized, there have also been proposals to replace 
Russian-sounding name endings in Azerbaijani surnames, such as “-ov,” “-ova,” “-(y)ev” and “-(y)eva,” with “-az” and 
“-yaz.” The reason for this is that “az” denotes the Azerbaijani Internet domain. 
Similarly, several new proposals have been put forward; and the Committee‟s proposals, which are being considered, 
will be accepted soon. While some Azerbaijani individuals and officials agree with the new proposal on names, others 
feel that any strict regulation will unfairly limit people‟s freedom to choose names that are already in widespread use, or 
that have special meanings within families. (Note 4) 
Thus, while the issue of names has a bearing on nationalism, people should, as a human right, be entitled to choose 
names freely. Given the opposing factors at play, this problem will likely not be easily resolved. 
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2.2 International Self-Promotion: A Source of National Pride 
Following Azerbaijan‟s acquisition of oil and gas revenue, the country has enhanced its image through several 
grandiose construction projects, including buildings, towers, and pipelines, and other projects, including production of 
the largest national flag in the world. It has hosted various large-scale international events, and recruited top-ranking 
foreign athletes to promote sporting excellence. Considerable wealth, acquired from oil and natural gas resources, has 
made these projects possible.  
Azerbaijan‟s self-promotion has been very effective within the country as well as internationally. This is because such 
tangible achievements are widely recognized, contributing to a positive image of Azerbaijan. In turn, this fosters 
national pride and, by extension, Azerbaijani nationalism. While it is impossible to cover all of Azerbaijan‟s remarkable 
achievements here, I will highlight some of the most impressive achievements below.  
2.2.1 The Azerbaijani Flag 
In 2011, Azerbaijan succeeded in developing the world‟s largest national flag, which is 70 meters long and flies atop a 
162-meter flagpole. It should be noted, however, that initial record-setting attempts failed because of strong winds. 
(Note 5) The record was broken within a short time, and the Azerbaijani flag is currently the second largest in the world. 
It is on display in the newly constructed Flag Park, from where residents have been forcibly relocated, and constitutes 
an important land mark for Azerbaijanis. 
2.2.2 Baku‟s Transformation 
Baku‟s development is another example of Azerbaijan‟s attempts at self-promotion. Small buildings, houses, and roads 
have been demolished and several grand buildings, as well as fine, wide roads have been constructed in the city. Baku‟s 
map, including that of the old city which has been renovated, has been transformed within a decade.  
The three Flame Towers, Baku‟s tallest skyscrapers at a height of 190 m (620 ft), have become landmarks in Azerbaijan. 
The buildings, comprising apartments, a hotel, and office blocks, have been built at an estimated cost of USD 350 
million. Their construction began in 2007 and was completed in 2012. Dubai-based companies had a role in their design 
and construction. The towers aptly symbolize Azerbaijan, which means “land of fire.” Their facades have been 
transformed into gigantic display screens deploying more than 10.000 high-power LED luminaires. 
The Heydar Aliyev Center, also in Baku, is another important symbol of Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev, which is named 
after the Azerbaijani word for “charisma,” is a building complex covering 619.000 square feet. (Note 6) This center was 
designed by Zaha Hadid, an Iraqi-British architect, known for her distinctive architecture and flowing, curved style 
eschewing sharp angles. (Note 7) Its construction began in 2007 and was completed in 2012.  
Azerbaijan‟s construction boom led to the development of many kinds of buildings designed for big events, such as 
great halls and stadiums. The Azerbaijan government continues to host large international events in Baku.  
2.2.3 The Olympic Games  
From the 2014 Olympics onward, Azerbaijan has repeatedly bid, although unsuccessfully, to host the summer or winter 
Olympic Games. The National Olympic Committee of Azerbaijan was created in 1992 and was recognized by the 
International Olympic Committee in 1993. Azerbaijan first participated at the Olympic Games as an independent nation 
in 1996 and has sent its athletes to compete at all subsequent Olympic. Games. 
Azerbaijani athletes have performed particularly well in combat sports, winning a total of 26 medals at the Summer 
Olympic Games in wrestling, shooting, boxing, judo, and weightlifting. However, no medals have been won by 
Azerbaijanis during the Winter Olympic Games. 
In addition to strongly influencing Azerbaijani nationalism, the Games have had political effects. For example, former 
President, Haydar Aliyev, appointed his son, Ilham Aliyev, as the president of the National Olympic Committee of 
Azerbaijan, despite the fact that holders of this post have normally been elected. He has retained the post since 1997 
until the time of this writing, and he was re-elected in 2001, 2008, and 2011. (Note 8) Ilham Aliyev was in fact disliked 
by Azerbaijanis during Heydar Aliyev‟s lifetime. However his reputation improved after the 2000 Olympics, during 
which Azerbaijan won three medals, including two gold ones. (Note 9) As the president of the National Olympic 
Committee of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev attended all of the Olympic events. The Olympics have strongly influenced 
Azerbaijani nationalism, with attempts to host big games in Azerbaijan and receiving as many medals as possible being 
key aspects of this nationalism. It is important to stress here that, as previously mentioned, despite criticism of their 
authoritarian rule, the Aliyev family is highly respected in Azerbaijan. 
At the time of writing, while Azerbaijan has not succeeded in hosting any Olympic Games it has hosted some other 
international sporting events, for example, in the fields of soccer and judo. The largest of these events was the European 
Games held in Baku in June 12–28, 2015. This was a significant event, regarded as a small-scale version of the Olympic 
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Games. In addition, the inception of the European Games took place in Azerbaijan, which won the most medals after 
Russia. (Note 10) Moreover, it has been decided that the 2016 Formula 1 Grand Prix of Europe will be held in Baku the 
Baku City Circuit, the construction of which is set to be completed before June 2016. 
To win more medals in such international games, Azerbaijan has recruited a number of foreign athletes, a common practice 
among nations, including Canada, Russia, and the US, has become widespread (Wilson & Lehren, 2008). (Note 11)  
Some individuals, facing citizenship processing delays in their home countries, applied for fast-track Azerbaijani 
citizenship to enable them to represent the country at skating events during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games held in 
Vancouver, Canada. For example, Morgan Matthews followed in the footsteps of the American-born ice dancer, Kristin 
Fraser, who represented Azerbaijan during the 2006 Olympics without ever having visited the country. 
At the 2012 Olympics, held in London, UK, where more than 50 athletes represented Azerbaijan, almost half were 
naturalized citizens originating from foreign countries. This highlighted a serious issue, which was further confirmed by 
an event in 2011, where two teenaged Bulgarian weightlifters, Boyanka Kostova and Valentin Hristov, switched their 
allegiance to Azerbaijan after Baku agreed to pay Bulgaria more than $500 000 to procure talented athletes. However, 
Bulgaria demanded an additional fee when it became clear that the duo would represent Azerbaijan at the 2012 Olympics, 
arguing that the original agreement did not permit this and threatening to block their participation. After months of 
squabbling, Bulgaria eventually relented and agreed to allow Kostova and Valentin to lift weights for Azerbaijan in 
London (Bigg, 2012; Kozlowska & Traywick, 2014). 
In addition, the inclusion of no less than six South Korean players in the women‟s field hockey team representing 
Azerbaijan at the European Championship caused outrage (Slot, 2008). Evidently, Azerbaijan has used large sums of 
money to attract top athletes to maximize wins in international games, and consequently to strengthen national pride. 
2.2.4 The Eurovision Song Contest 
The various new extravagant buildings in Azerbaijan include a grand music hall. Within the wider community of 
European nations participating in the annual Eurovision Song Contest, the nation to which the winner belongs hosts the 
Contest the following year. Azerbaijan made its debut at the Eurovision Song Contest in 2008, and its pop duo, Eldar 
and Nigar (also known as Ell and Nikki) won the contest in 2011. This brought great honor to the Azerbaijanis and to 
Azerbaijan, which gained the right to host the Eurovision Song Contest in 2012. In preparation for hosting the 2012 
Contest, Azerbaijan constructed a magnificent hall and related buildings; this involved extensive forced migrations in 
the construction zone. It is not widely known that many protest movements were initiated to oppose the construction.  
Moreover, substantial corruption relating to the construction was uncovered. In May 2012, a joint investigation was 
launched by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. A leading 
Azerbaijani journalist, Khadija Ismayilova,
 
discovered that the Aliyev family had personally profited from the 
construction of the Crystal Hall, the new concert showplace built to host the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest at a cost of 
USD 134 million. (Note 12) Thus, while being a potent symbol of Azerbaijani national pride and nationalism, it also 














Figure 1. The 2011 Azerbaijani commemorative stamp 
Description: This stamp portrays Eldar‟s and Nigar‟s winning of the 2011 Eurovision Song Contest. 
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2.2.5 Oil and Gas Pipelines and Communication Networks 
Azerbaijan is making good use of its resource wealth to position itself as a regional hub for oil and natural gas as well as 
rail and road networks linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey with Europe. In 2006, the well-known 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline began operations, serving as the main pipeline for exporting Azerbaijani gas. 
Moreover, it is also a political pipeline. Within Azerbaijan, the BTC pipeline is known as the “Heydar Aliyev” pipeline 
in honor of the national hero. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas pipeline has also been constructed, running alongside this 
pipeline. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey are now working to develop a rail and road network connecting Baku with 
Tbilisi and Kars. After the collapse of the plan to develop the Nabucco pipeline as the new southern pipeline extending 
from Azerbaijan to Europe, detouring Ukraine, it was decided that three relatively small and connected pipelines would 
be constructed instead. These are: the Nabucco-West pipeline, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, and the Trans Anatolian 
Natural Gas Pipeline. While both Azerbaijan and Turkey are responsible for the latter, this can be considered an 
Azerbaijani project, because the operator is the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) which holds a 
58% share in this project. (Note 13) Such international infrastructure is also fostering Azerbaijani national pride and has 
raised Azerbaijan‟s status globally. 
2.2.6 The Role of the Azerbaijani Diaspora in Promoting Nationalism: Focusing on the Khojaly Tragedy  
The impact of the NKC on Azerbaijani nationalism seems to be waning every year, with more than two decades having 
passed since the declaration of a ceasefire. However, as a key symbolic reminder of the NKC, the Khojaly tragedy 
continues to fuel Azerbaijani nationalism. 
The Khojaly tragedy, also known as the Khojaly Massacre, refers to a serious incident that occurred during the NKC on 
February 25–26, 1992. According to the Azerbaijani government, as well as Memorial Human Rights Center, Human 
Rights Watch, and other international observers, the massacre was committed by ethnic Armenian armed forces, 
reportedly with the help of the Russian 366
th
 Motor Rifle Regiment, which did not apparently act on orders from the 
command. The death toll claimed by Azerbaijani authorities was 613 civilians, including 106 women and 63 children. 
This incident was the worst and largest massacre that occurred during the conflict and became symbolic of the NKC, 
further fueling Azerbaijanis‟ feelings of enmity toward the Armenians. The conflict has inspired numerous mourning 
ceremonies and events, worldwide.  
Within Azerbaijan, many such ceremonies and events are held, and TV programs about the conflict are broadcasted 
every year. In recent years, the Azerbaijani diaspora has organized such events worldwide, especially in the US.  
The term “diaspora” initially referred to the dispersal of the Jews outside of Palestine after Babylon‟s capture. However, 
it now refers more broadly to any group dispersed, for whatever reason, outside of its traditional homeland.  
The Azerbaijani diaspora is not insignificant in size and its influence is growing. It comprises Azerbaijani communities 
living outside of Azerbaijan or within the Iranian portion of Azerbaijan. Its numbers and distribution are shown in Table 1.  
The State Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic on Work with Diaspora was specifically established to handle 
communications with the diaspora and to promote the creation of new societies and organizations. By 2004, the 
Committee had succeeded in creating about 40 new Azerbaijani communities worldwide. (Note 14) Of these, Azerbaijani 
societies or organizations in the US, Russia, and Germany have been especially prominent, with many Azerbaijani 
communities in these countries being very active. (Note 15) 
Table 1. The Azerbaijani diaspora 
 Country Registered Azerbaijani Population Estimated Azerbaijani population 
1 Russia 603 070 (2010) 1 500 000–3 000 000 
2 Turkey  ------ 800 000 
3 Georgia 284 761 (2002) 360 000 (2007) 
4 Kazakhstan 85 292 (2009) 150 000  
5 Germany 15 219 (2006) 200 000 
6 Ukraine 45 176 (2001) ------ 
7 Netherlands  ------ 7 000–18 000 (2009) 
8 Kyrgyzstan 17 267 (2009) ------ 
9 United Kingdom  ------ 15 000 (2009) 
10 United States 14 205 (2000)(from the Republic of 
Azerbaijan) 
40 400 (from Iran) 
400 000 
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11 Canada 4 580 (2011) 80 000 
12 France  ------ 70 000 
1 112 (asylum-seekers) 
13 Uzbekistan 44 410 (1989) ------ 
14 Turkmenistan 33 365 (1989)  ------ 
15 Belarus 5 567 (2009) ------ 
16 Latvia 1 697 (2001) ------ 
17 Estonia 880 (2000) ------ 
18 Lithuania 788 ------ 
19 Tajikistan 800 (2000) ------ 
20 Australia 300 ------ 
21 Austria 1.159 ------ 
22 Denmark 231 ------ 
Description: The table depicts the registered and estimated populations of a number of countries.  
Examples of such activities include actions to promote memorials relating to the Khojaly tragedy. This paper focuses on 
movements in Washington, DC, and New York, where memorials have been organized annually since 2010 with the 
cooperation of the Azerbaijani government and Azerbaijani diasporic organizations. Their aim is not only to sustain the 
memory of the Khojaly tragedy, but also to foster wider recognition of this event abroad, especially in influential global 
centers such as Washington, DC, and New York.  
The Azerbaijani-American Alliance (AAA), which was founded as a non-partisan and non-profit organization, and has 
been active in the US, conducts large-scale campaigns focusing on the Khojaly tragedy.  
According to the AAA, as part of this campaign, hundreds of ads bearing the slogan “Khojaly: A Human Tragedy Against 
Azerbaijan” (see Figure 2) were posted on portable and stationary information boards at metro stations, bus stops, and on 
the exteriors of buses and trains. They were even posted in conspicuous areas in the two cities such as the large board in 
New York‟s Times Square. These informative signs, posted on the sides of buildings, are illuminated by the lights of 
passing cars. At some locations, several video posters rotating at 180 degrees have also been installed.  
 
Figure 2. A commemorative sign about the Khojali tragedy posted by the Azerbaijani diaspora in New York 
Description: The photograph was taken by the author on January 11, 2014 at a New York metro station. 
Members of the Azerbaijani diaspora believe that, through their activities, millions of Americans will become aware of 
the Khojali tragedy. It is their aim, and that of the Azerbaijani government, to foster wider recognition of the tragedy and 
of the harshness of the Armenians.  
Some groups have also initiated protests. For example, the Azerbaijan Association of New York organized a 
demonstration in front of the Armenian Mission to UN and the UN building located at the corner of Dag Hammarskjold 
Plaza on February 26, 2015. 
In addition to public awareness efforts, the Khojaly campaign has included lobbying efforts aimed at convincing 
legislative bodies at various levels to formally recognize the massacre. In 2013, a petition seeking formal recognition of 
the tragedy was submitted to the White House. Thus far, state legislatures in Arkansas and New Mexico have adopted 
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resolutions commemorating Khojaly. Since 2010, legislatures in Massachusetts, Texas, New Jersey, Maine, and Georgia 
have also recognized Khojaly, with another “two to three” states working on this, according to Adil Baguirov, the 
co-founder and managing director of the US Azeris Network (Baguirov, 2013). In addition, national parliaments in 
Mexico, Colombia, Pakistan, and the Czech Republic have formally recognized the Massacre.  
However, the campaign has not always proceeded smoothly. For example, a petition calling on the White House to 
“issue a proclamation commemorating and recognizing the war crime of the Khojaly massacre, and its victims” (Kucera, 
2013) received more than 125 000 signatures in 2013. It was the second most popular petition in the short history of the 
White House's public petition program, under which the presidential administration will respond to any petition with 
more than 100 000 signatures. However the official White House response was tepid: “While we will not be issuing a 
Presidential Proclamation, the United States deeply regrets the tragic losses of life in the war between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia” (Kucera, 2013). Although very disappointed, Azerbaijanis have affirmed that they will continue their 
activities with enthusiasm. (Note 16) 
3. The Regional and International Contexts 
3.1 Has Nationalism Influenced the Iranian Azerbaijanis? 
The Aras River divides the Azerbaijanis into those living in Azerbaijan and those in Iranian territory. It is not known 
exactly how many Azerbaijanis live in Iran. However, this population is estimated to be more than double that that of 
the Azerbaijan Republic. The reason for the division of Azerbaijanis within two states originates from the Treaty of 
Turkmenchay (1828), wherein Iran was forced to cede its dependent khanates located north of the Aras River to Russia. 
Consequently, Azerbaijanis refer to the Azerbaijan Republic as “North Azerbaijan” and to northern parts of Iran 
inhabited by Azerbaijani as “South Azerbaijan.” Although both groups speak Azeri and share the same culture, their 
intonations differ slightly and their perceptions and ways of thinking are also different. However, many Northern 
Azerbaijanis tend not to differentiate between Azerbaijanis living in the Republic and in Iranian Azerbaijan, regarding 
the latter as “kith and kin and not small people have family [on] the other side of the River Aras (Atabaki, 2000; 
Fawcett, 2009; Heradstveit, 2009). 
Within the multiethnic Iranian state, the Azerbaijanis constitute the largest minority group, variously estimated to 
comprise between a fifth and a third of the total population. Many Azerbaijanis also have highly influential positions 
within Iran, especially in business, social and religious circles. For example, Ali Hosseini Khamenei, the second and 
current Supreme Leader of Iran and a Muslim cleric, is ethnically Azerbaijani. Furthermore, the warm climate and 
fertile land of northern Iran, where the Azerbaijani reside, are well suited to agriculture. Consequently, Iran highly 
values this area and its people and aims to retain them. 
While Azerbaijanis, especially the nationalists and intelligentsia, in the Azerbaijan Republic have long attempted to 
recover “South Azerbaijan,” there has been no large-scale movement for integration except for a very short time during 
perestroika. However, most of the Iranian Azerbaijani have never wanted integration with the Azerbaijan Republic. 
When I interviewed them, they provided the following reasons. (Note 18) They accord the highest value to stability and 
Iran provides them with such stability, enabling them to live without any shortages relating to jobs, foods, and money. 
Conversely, the Azerbaijan Republic is in conflict with Armenia and has been confused by issues relating to Russia. 
However,, the Azerbaijani language is not officially used in Iran, including in schools, and alcohol consumption is 
banned. These are causes of dissatisfaction among Iranian Azerbaijanis. (Note 19) The Iranian Azerbaijanis, like many 
people in the former USSR, seem to be yearning for stability more than freedom. In addition, the rights of Iranian 
Azerbaijanis seem to be improving. For example, in 1997, the policies of President Muhammad Khatami, then newly 
elected, widened the scope of cultural rights for minorities to win the support of the periphery. 
However, Iran has been overly apprehensive about movements to integrate Azerbaijanis across Azerbaijan and Iran, 
although such movements may not occur in the near future and most Iranian Azerbaijanis want to maintain the status 
quo. Iranian authorities also fear that the Azerbaijan Republic, as a large, rich, successful, and attractive country, will be 
very appealing to Iranian Azerbaijanis who may desire integration with Azerbaijan. Therefore, Iran has a negative 
attitude toward Azerbaijan and is trying to undermine the Azerbaijan Republic. This is reflected in Iran‟s support for 
Armenia, a Christian state, during the NKC and its attempts to obstruct Azerbaijan‟s oil and gas projects, despite the 
fact that both Azerbaijan and Iran are Islamic (Shi„ite) states. (Note 20)
 
 
Currently, however, Azerbaijan is acknowledged as an economically successful state because of its oil and natural gas 
wealth, and Azerbaijani nationalism is growing. 
3.2 Recent Activities and Movements of Iranian Azerbaijanis 
While there were only a few movements focusing on the integration of the Azerbaijanis at the end of the perestroika 
period, pan-Azerbaijani movements have emerged over the last decade.  
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Nationalism is often triggered by tragedies, including war, conflict, political turmoil, and natural disasters. Although 
Azerbaijani nationalism has always existed in northwestern Iran, it has greatly increased from the 1990s onward. This 
can be attributed to a combination of several different factors affecting the Azerbaijani minority. Here, I identify the 
most important factors that have influenced Iran‟s Azerbaijanis.  
An immanent American attack on Iran in the spring of 2006 prompted a revival of the flagging idea of a pan-Azeri 
identity. Indeed, Azerbaijan feared that a military attack on Iran could destabilize the country to such a degree that 
oppressed minorities could seek new alliances with surrounding states and ethnic groups.  
Subsequently, riots broke out in May and June of 2006. On May 12, 2006, the Iranian state newspaper, Iran, printed a 
grossly insulting caricature of an Azerbaijani as a stupid, dirty cockroach with an article directed against the Azerbaijani 
minority. Following this publication, thousands of demonstrators amassed in cities of Iran that were mostly populated 
by Azerbaijanis, as well as in Tehran, where demonstrations were initiated by students. The protestors even seized a 
television transmitter for a short period in the western city of Urmia, as well as a municipal building in the eastern city 
of Sulduz. The vast majority of local police and militia groups, composed of ethnic Azerbaijanis, refused to take action 
against their compatriots. The demonstrators called for punishment of those responsible for the caricature and the article; 
a demand that was finally met. The authors of the article and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper were dismissed, and 
publication of the newspaper was temporarily suspended. However, the demonstrations continued. Protestors shouted 
political slogans such as: “I am proud to be a Turk!” “Down with Persian chauvinism!” “Keep your hands off of 
Azerbaijan!” and “We want instruction in Turkish in our schools!” Militia and army units were called in from other 
areas in Iran to end the demonstrations, resulting in dozens of deaths. According to some reports, mainly provided by 
Azerbaijani nationalists, there were more than 100 victims. The exact number of victims is not, however, known 
because of Teheran‟s strict information embargo concerning the events in northwestern Iran (Alikhan, 2008, p. 98). 
Thus, if a conflict or a domestic crisis were to occur, it would likely fuel Azeri ethno-nationalism. 
Further, a sizeable number of young Iranians are dissatisfied with the restrictive regime of the clerics, and this 
dissatisfaction was exacerbated during the bloody unrest surrounding the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009. 
At that time, feelings against the Iranian authorities had some impact on assertions of Azerbaijani nationalism and other 
(Moosavi, 2007). 
Technical developments too have helped to strengthen self-identification among Iranian Azerbaijanis. For many years, 
Iranian Azerbaijanis could only watch the news on Azerbaijani television channels, and that too, for just 30 minutes in a 
week. However, by accessing satellite broadcasts, they are not only able to watch Azerbaijani channels now, but also 
Turkish and western channels (Souleimanov, Pikal, & Kraus, 2013). Such programs have enhanced feelings of being 
“Azerbaijani” or “Turkish” among Iranian Azerbaijanis. 
Commencing from 2000, the Lake Urmia controversy has led to infusion of the environmental movement with 
Azerbaijani nationalism. Located on the border between the Iranian provinces of Western and Eastern Azerbaijan, Lake 
Urmia is a unique natural site and is listed as a UNESCO biosphere reservation. However, this salt lake faces severe 
environmental threats attributed to its lack of outflow and agricultural intensification in surrounding areas. Moreover, 
increasing use of water from rivers that feed the lake and the construction of over 30 dams in these streams have led to 
steady shrinkage of the lake‟s surface area. According to some experts, the lake could dry up completely within just a 
few years. However, the Iranian government has not taken any serious measures to address this issue. Iranian 
Azerbaijanis, for whom the lake is symbolic of Southern Azerbaijan, feel strongly about this and have launched a series 
of protests, hoping to draw attention to this serious ecological problem. The Iranian authorities took a very hard line 
against the demonstrators, as they always do. Consequently, the demonstrators reacted by raising political and 
nationalistic issues during the protests.  
Despite the government‟s negative reaction, further demonstrations occurred in mid-2011, during which slogans such as: 
“Lake Urmia is drying up; Iran has ordered its execution,” and “Urmia is thirsty. Azerbaijan must take a stand or lose 
the lake” were common (Souleimanov, Pikal, & Kraus, 2013).  
Thus, while the Iranian Azerbaijani undertook several nationalistic actions or demonstrations, the Iranian government‟s 
consistently negative attitude and harsh responses repeatedly reinforced Azerbaijani nationalism, resulting in a vicious 
cycle.  
From the early 2000s, in spite of restrictions imposed by the Iranian authorities, Azerbaijanis have held regular mass 
marches to their nationally symbolic sites: Mount Savalan and the Bazz Fortress. Separatist slogans, pan-Turkic 
symbolism, and displays of the banned flag of South Azerbaijan (which is similar to that of the Republic of Azerbaijan) 
are widely deployed during these marches. In addition to the marches, clashes between ethnically Azerbaijani and Persian 
soccer fans are becoming increasingly frequent. Moreover, anonymous posters calling for instruction in Turkish, along 
with flags of Azerbaijan and Turkey, have begun to appear in Tabriz, Urmia, Maraz, Sulduz, Ardabil, and several other 
International Journal of Social Science Studies                                                      Vol. 4, No. 5; 2016 
146 
 
towns in Iranian Azerbaijan. The posters are put up overnight in prominent places and are immediately torn down by 
police and militia units. 
In addition, some explosions occurred at the police station in northern Iran in 2009, for which Azerbaijani nationalists 
were thought to be responsible. Azerbaijani nationalistic movements have been limited up to now in Iran. However, 
authorities in both Azerbaijan and Iran fear that the movements could connect nationalists residing in Azerbaijan and 
Iran and, therefore, expand. 
3.3. Keeping the Balance: The Role of Diplomacy 
In recent years, there have been dramatic changes in the global situation, notable examples being the Ukrainian and 
Syria crises. These developments have created a difficult situation in and around Russia, which is a very important 
neighbor to Azerbaijan. In addition, China‟s global influence has radically increased, as evidenced by its efforts to 
realize its goal of “One Belt, One Road” and its leading role in founding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB).  
However, Azerbaijan does not seem to have been significantly affected by these radical changes in the international 
environment. From the time of Heydar Aliyev‟s presidency and the establishment of the “Aliyev regime,” Azerbaijan 
has maintained a good balance, diplomatically, between Russia and the West (the US and Europe). The Azerbaijanis 
strongly support this diplomatic policy because of the difficulties they experienced during the time of the Elchbei 
regime, which, as previously mentioned, invited reprisals from Russia because of its strongly pro-West and pro-Turkey 
stance. 
Georgia, Azerbaijan‟s neighbor, has adopted an anti-Russian and pro-Western policy, inviting many kinds of retaliatory 
actions by Russia such as economic sanctions, the August War in 2008, and recognition of the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are not recognized by Georgia. Azerbaijan‟s careful efforts to maintain a balance 
between Russia and the West seem to have been successful. (Note 21) Despite its close relations with Turkey, 
Azerbaijan was able to maintain a status quo with both Turkey and Russia after their relationship was seriously 
undermined by an incident entailing the shooting down of a Russian military airplane by Turkey in November 2015. 
Consequently, Russia has not taken a strong stance against Azerbaijan in recent years and the relation between them is 
stable.  
Moreover, Azerbaijan has not been affected by the situation relating to Iran, for example, the lifting of sanctions against 
Iran by the West especially by the US. Despite being close neighbors, the two countries have a strained relation.  
A final point is that Azerbaijan has not been affected by recent Chinese activities. China, which has been extending its 
influence in Eurasia, including the former USSR, through its “One Belt, One Road” policy, maintains that it has already 
established strong ties with Azerbaijan. This is evidenced, according to China‟s leaders and media, by goods that 
Chinese have transported via rail, although in fact they not only used the rail transportation to Turkmenistan, but also 
transportation by vessel across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijan has joined the 
AIIB, which is mainly led by China. Azerbaijan‟s neighbor, Georgia, has been strongly influenced by China, with many 
Chinese companies operating in Georgia. However, Azerbaijani officials, journalists, and academicians deny China‟s 
claims of an association with Azerbaijan, claiming that Azerbaijan is still free from Chinese influence and that there has 
not yet been any significant movement of Chinese companies into Azerbaijan (Note 22).  
Thus, Azerbaijan has been successful in maintaining a balanced policy and self-reliance. Moreover, a factor that seems 
to have fueled Azerbaijani nationalism is such strong attitudes on the part of other sovereign states.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to elucidate the complex situation of Azerbaijani nationalism. Despite its brief history, 
Azerbaijani nationalism has been complicated, entailing a shift in its characteristics over a short duration commencing 
from its second independence after 1991.  
Azerbaijani nationalism has been influenced by many factors, including religion, history, culture and relations with 
Iranian Azerbaijanis. While the NKC and relations with Russia prompted nationalism among the Azerbaijanis, its 
characteristics changed, over time, after the NKC ceasefire.  
Movements around nationalism, in addition to domestic practices such as name changes, have been important factors 
behind recent trends in Azerbaijani nationalism. Efforts to appeal to the international community through various 
constructions and good performances at international competitions, and by hosting large-scale events, have had 
significant effects on Azerbaijanis as well as on the international community. In addition, the activities of the 
Azerbaijani diaspora, supported by the Azerbaijan government, are also attracting attention. Movements relating to 
Azerbaijan nationalism further resonate with those of Iranian Azerbaijanis. Especially in recent years, Azerbaijani 
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nationalism within Iran has been growing, prompted by the situation of the Azerbaijan Republic, political and economic 
dissatisfaction with the Iranian government, and free access to global information. In addition, the Aliyev regime has 
succeeded in maintaining balanced diplomacy not only between Russia and the West, but also between Russia and 
China, along with a policy of self-reliance.  
Thus, while Azerbaijani nationalism has been considered an outcome of the NKC, it has subsequently been transformed 
and is now multilayered and complex. Thus, whereas Azerbaijani nationalism has been attributed solely to 
anti-Armenian and anti-Russian sentiments, national pride which has been fueled by domestic and international factors, 
is currently playing an important role in its creation and maintenance.  
However, recent expressions of Azerbaijani nationalism have been extravagant and are sustained by Azerbaijan‟s 
economic prosperity, based on its oil and gas wealth. The present base of nationalism is thus weak and fragile, and 
Azerbaijan should, consequently, change its underlying attitude relating to its nationalism policy. The Azerbaijani 
government should diversify its economy and growth, maintaining Azerbaijani nationalism, domestically and 
internationally, at a much lower cost. 
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Notes 
Note 1. These findings are based on the author‟s interviews with Azerbaijanis from 2000 to 2013. However, they only 
apply to people older than 40 years old.  
Note 2. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the Republic of the Armenian Republic and Azerbaijan centered on the 
self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which was formerly an autonomous region of Azerbaijan. Ethnic Armenians 
living in this region periodically initiated movements calling for annexation to Armenia during the Soviet period. In 
light of perestroika, ethnic Armenians launched a new and initially peaceful movement in the late 1980s. However, 
following the Sumgait Incident in February 1988, standpoints changed. While Armenians have insisted that the incident 
constituted genocide against their people, the Azerbaijanis claim that it was an Armenian conspiracy. The movement 
subsequently became violent and both sides initiated radical actions such as ethnic cleansing. After the collapse of the 
USSR in 1991, the conflict escalated into a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with Russia supporting Armenia, 
which, therefore, had an advantage. In 1994, an official ceasefire was signed with Russian mediation, and Nagorno 
Karabakh‟s status as the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” has remained unrecognized. The ceasefire was been almost kept 
after 1994, although there were some armed crashes and not small soldiers and residences of both sides were killed or 
wounded every year. However, the tensions between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces along the line of contact 
(LOC) escalated and it caused a five-day exchange of fire from 2nd April 2016, which was the biggest and bloodiest 
military confrontation since the 1994 ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire agreement is almost kept as of 8
th
 April 2016, 
however it is impossible to predict whether or not ceasefire will continue into the future. 
Note 3. “Black January” (Azerbaijani: Qara Yanvar) was a violent crackdown by the Soviet army that took place on 
January 19–20, 1990 in Baku. Following the incident, USSR President Gorbachev and Defence Minister Yazov asserted 
that military law was necessary to halt the violence committed against the Armenian population and to thwart the efforts 
of the Azerbaijani independence movement to overthrow the Soviet-backed Azerbaijani government. However, Yazov 
acknowledged that the real purpose of “Black January” was to dismantle the Azerbajani Popular Front, which was very 
active and effective at that time. In 1995, Gorbachev apologized, admitting that the operation had been a grave error. 
After “Black January,” the APF lost power and the Communist Party regained its position. According to official 
estimates, between 133 and 137 Azerbaijani civilians died, 800 people were injured, and 5 persons went missing. 
However unofficial number put the number of victims who died at 300. 
Note 4. See: Azerbaijan „may ban Russian names,‟_BBC News, March 5, 2013.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21658746 
Note 5. Baku means” the city of wind.” 
Note 6. For more details on the Heydar Aliyev Center, see: http://www.heydaraliyevcenter.az/#main. 
Note 7. Zaha Hadid is widely known as the “queen of the unbuilt” because the complexity of her designs makes them 
highly expensive. Consequently the Japanese government rejected her design submitted for the main stadium to be used 
for 2020 Olympics. We can, therefore, conjecture on how huge a sum of money the Azerbaijani government paid her for 
designing this center. Hadid has also been criticized by the Western media and by humanitarian organizations, because 
some people feel that the selection of her design implies her cooperation in maintaining Azerbaijani authoritarianism.  
Note 8. The National Olympic Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic. For further details, see: 
http://www.acnolympic.org/nocs/nocs-directory/europe/azerbaijan/ 
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Note 9 See the National Olympic Committee Homepage on Azerbaijan (http://www.olympic.org/azerbaijan). 
Note 10. Further details can be found at the official site of the European Games:  
http://www.baku2015.com/news/index.html. 
Note 11. For example, out of 3 000 athletes who competed at the 2014 Winter Olympics held in Sochi, 120 participated in 
teams that did not represent their birth countries. Numbers of such athletes were highest for the following countries: 
Canada: 9, Russia: 7, United States: 7, France: 6, Australia: 5, Germany: 5, Israel: 5, Italy: 5, Azerbaijan: 4, Belarus: 4, 
and Ireland: 4. (http://www.ksl.com/?nid=335&sid=28799121). 
Note 12. Khadija Ismayilova is a highly capable journalist who has won prestigious international journalism awards. 
She was arrested based on a trumped-up charge and placed in a cell before the trial. She is currently undergoing an 
unfair trial. 
Note 13. SOCAR initially retained 80% of the shares, while two Turkish companies (BotaŞ and TPAO) held the 
remaining 20%. However, BP subsequently joined this project. Consequently, the division of shares is now 58%, 30%, 
and 12% held by SOCAR, BotaŞ, and BP, respectively. 
Note 14. See the Azerbaijani Government‟s official website:  
http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/Society/Diaspora/diaspora_01_e.html. 
Note 15. Based on the author‟s interviews conducted in Russia in 2005, in Germany in 2010, and in the US in 2013. 
Note 16. Based on the author‟s interviews conducted in New York in 2013. 
Note 17. Iranian Azerbaijanis interviewed by the author in Tabriz in East Azerbaijan Province from August 23–30, 2005 
included academicians, religious officials, students, and general citizens. 
Note 18. According to Islamic rules, Muslims are not permitted to drink alcohol. However, Muslims in the Azerbaijan 
Republic follow these rules very loosely. Therefore, many drink alcohol, ignore Ramadan, and (women) do not wear 
scarves. 
Note 19. Actually, Muslim cannot drink alcohols by the Islamic rule, however the Muslims of Azerbaijan Republic are 
very loose for the Islamic rule. Therefore many of them are drinking alcohols, ignoring Ramadan, and not wearing scarf 
and so on. 
Note 20. For further details, see Hirose (2014). 
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